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Abstract We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terror-
ism,whichwe termDefense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources
that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other gov-
ernments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast,
Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the ter-
rorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the
overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3 × 3
“Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both coun-
tries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit
from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN)
can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the
burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing
policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a
cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treat-
ments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium
of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in
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a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect
on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an
institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant
improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy.
1 Motivation
In combating terrorism, a government often faces a choice between two basic strate-
gies: to pursue actions that directly undermine the capabilities of the terrorist orga-
nization, or actions that defend against terrorist attacks by hardening targets, thereby
reducing damage in the event of an attack. Preventative actions, such as destroying a
terrorist training ground, benefit all governments that are potential terrorist targets, as
the terrorist’s power to inflict damage is reduced, while the costs are borne entirely by
the government that initiates the action. Defensive actions such as increased screening
at points of entry or reinforcing the perimeter of an embassy may reduce the attrac-
tiveness of the defending government, while making other countries relatively more
attractive as targets.
These tradeoffs are explored theoretically in a series of articles that identify the
fundamental externalities associated with preventative and defensive counterterror
strategies (Sander 2003; Sandler 2005;Arce andSandler 2005a,b; Sandler andSiqueira
2006). In a “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” framework, Arce and Sandler (2005a) model
this choice as a pair of Prisoner’s Dilemma games, combined into a 3 × 3 matrix
consisting of three policy alternatives: Defense, Prevention, and Take No Action.
They use this framework to illustrate the difficulty faced by countries that desire to
coordinate on a policy of preventative action. While Prevention is the most efficient
choice in the game, each country is tempted to free ride on the others’ investment.
With defensive policies, countries capture the benefits of their investment, but impose
“costs” (in the sense of increased likelihood of attack) on other countries. The Nash
equilibrium of the game is for both countries to invest in defensive actions, an out-
come that is doubly inefficient in that it is both Pareto dominated and minimizes
the utilitarian sum of the countries involved. Thus countries face a difficult problem
in coordinating on effective counterterrorist policies. The incentive structure of the
interaction implies that countries acting in their individual self-interest will fail to
reach the optimal policy choice, and instead each invests in sub-optimal defensive
policies.
International organizations have arisen to combat myriad collective action prob-
lems. With respect to terrorism, peacekeeping is an activity that is often rationalized
as a means of stabilizing areas that may otherwise turn out to be terrorist breeding
grounds. The two institutions that carry out the majority of peacekeeping missions—
the UN and NATO—are financed by voluntary contributions, making the question of
burden sharing for preventative counterterror policies a central one. INTERPOL is
another international organization that is voluntarily financed, and its MIND/FIND
database for stolen and lost travel documents, for example, has been shown to be cost
effective in combating terrorism (Sandler et al. 2011).
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A promising avenue for testing the effect of alternative policies to enhance coun-
terterror policy coordination is to simulate countries’ choices in the lab. Testing such
policies in the field is costly or impossible. The lab provides a kind of wind-tunnel for
exploring policy options at a relatively low cost. The impact of the incentive structure
of a given policy can be evaluated, and alternatives compared. This is the approach
we use in the current paper.
The current paper utilizes the experimental environment developed in Arce et al.
(2011a,b), which experimentally tests the theoretical predictions of the Nested PD
game.1 In their experiment, subjects were matched in stable pairs for 20 rounds.
In the 21st round subjects were re-matched and the stakes increased by a factor of
10. As is common in experimental studies of repeated standard PD games (Sally
1995), non-equilibrium behavior was clearly evident in early rounds of the 20-round
section of the experiment. Initially 55% of subjects played Prevention, 30% chose
Take No Action (maintained the status quo) and 15% acted non-cooperatively and
selected the Defense strategy, consistent with Nash equilibrium play. By the 20th
round, 60%of the subjects behavednon-cooperatively. In the 21st round, 58%behaved
non-cooperatively and 26% cooperatively (the remainder chose Take No Action).
Hence, while the experimental results are not as dire as theory predicts, the collective
action problem remains one that subjects do not easily overcome on their own; hence
we consider institution building in the form of cost-sharing rules for preventative
counterterror policy.
We expand this framework to test the ability of a stylized institution, cost sharing, to
alleviate the collective action problem. In the experiment we implement three different
levels of cost sharing, while holding the Nash equilibrium of the game constant. Our
experimental conditions can be interpreted as different policies enforcing the sharing
of the cost of investing in Prevention: this policy diminishes the risk that otherswill free
ride on such a decision. Policies vary in the extent to which players share the cost of
choosingPrevention.Cost sharing serves to partially internalize the positive externality
associatedwith Prevention,while keeping the negative externality of choosingDefense
constant. We systematically manipulate the intensity of cost sharing in a linear way.
The cost of Prevention is not shared at all in the Baseline, one unit is shared in the Low
Burden Sharing condition, two units in the Moderate, and three in the High Burden
Sharing treatment.
We find that cost sharing can be a powerful policy choice, boosting the utilization
of the optimal policy, but only when the level of cost sharing is high. Low levels of cost
sharing are more symbolic than effective, and have little impact on strategy choices,
with more than half of the pairs playing the defensive strategy. But a high level of cost
sharing (as in our High Burden Sharing treatment) induces almost around 85% of the
pairs to cooperate,2 choosing mutual Prevention.
1 This paper also compares the deterministic-payment Nested PD presented in the theory (see Table 1)
with a probabilistic treatment where the expected values of the individual elements equal the deterministic
values, but successful attacks lead to payoff losses. The authors find that the preventative choice is selected
with less frequency in the probabilistic treatment.
2 Aggregating rounds 1–21.
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The experimental analysis of cost sharing in Prisoner Dilemma and related games
is not new, and can be traced back to Smith (1980) analysis of contract mechanisms. It
is far from the goal of this paper to make a complete survey of this particular branch of
the extensive literature on cost-sharing mechanisms.3 However, the natural reference
for our paper is Andreoni and Varian (1999), who analyze a two-stage variant of a
PD game in which players are allowed to make side payments. In this setting, the
unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is efficient and supported by their experimental
test. Charness et al. (2007) extend their analysis to show that side payments can be
efficient in PDgameswhenplayers have the chance of simultaneously choose a binding
transfer in a preliminary stage. The compensationmechanism in Charness et al. (2007)
transforms the PD into a coordination game in which mutual defection can still be an
equilibrium in some treatments. However, as in Andreoni and Varian (1999), most
transfers observed in the experiment were consistent with a SPE involving mutual
cooperation, suggesting that cooperation gains are explained by equilibrium play.4
Our experimental test of different cost sharing mechanism differs from previous
papers in three main respects. First, the degree of cost sharing is not selected by sub-
jects, but rather exogenously imposed. We consider this to be the right approach when
trying to identify the behavioral implications of different institutions. Second, all treat-
ments share the same inefficient Nash equilibrium prediction: mutual Defense. Ratio-
nal, selfish players should not change their behavior relative to our control treatment
with no cost sharing. We believe this feature provides a strong test for the emergence
of cooperation under different cost sharing rules. Our last contribution has to do with
the double-externality game and the asymmetric nature of our cost sharing mecha-
nism. While Prevention generates a positive externality, Defense generates a negative
one. Cost sharing is implemented only for the Prevention strategy. This asymmetry is
of particular interest in the domain of counterterrorism policies and has never been
explored in the laboratory.
This paper contributes to the literature on conflict resolution. Our results strongly
suggest that the effectiveness of different policies is heavily mediated by behavioral
biases, hard to anticipate in a theoretical model, but easy to estimate in the lab. Our
between-subjects experimental design tests different cost sharing policies in a simple
decision environment. Subjects do react to the introduction of a cost sharing mech-
anism, even when all games share the same theoretical prediction. However, they
respond only when the level of cost sharing is high. The significant increase in the
utilization of the optimal strategy is stable across the 20 repetitions of the original
game, and observed again in one last round in which the stakes are much higher and
participants are randomly re-matched. In this sense, this paper extends cost sharing to
a new environment, and shows the necessity of a better understanding of how different
institutions solve conflict by inducing more out-of-equilibrium cooperative play.
3 Fong and Surti (2009) and Matsushima (2012) survey the recent theoretical literature.
4 Compensation mechanisms have also been analyzed in the parallel domain of public goods games. Not
surprisingly, results are similar to the ones described for PD games. Chen (2003) and Razzolini et al. (2007)
find that subjects easily converge to the efficient Nash equilibrium under different compensation regimes.
Bracht et al. (2008) get a similar result in amore sophisticated environment (the public good uses a quadratic
production function with interior equilibrium).
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Finally, it illustrates the power of the lab in exploring policy alternatives. Our work
contributes to the growing experimental literature on terrorism and counterterrorism
policy (e.g., Cadigan and Schmitt 2010; Colombier et al. 2011; Arce et al. 2011a
provide a survey.) The lab is increasingly being utilized to examine questions in this
area that are difficult to address using observational or survey data, or theory alone.
We return to this discussion in the conclusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the
Nested PD game used in our experiment. Section 3 presents the experimental design,
Sect. 4 presents our hypothesis, and Sect. 5 procedures. Section 6 analyzes the results
and the last section concludes.
2 The nested PD game
The primary vehicle for our experiments is the 3×3 global security game developed in
Arce and Sandler (2005a). The game combines elements of a voluntary-contribution
public goods game, which corresponds to the externality generated by preventative
counterterror actions, with those of a commons dilemma in the sense ofHarden (1968),
corresponding to the externality associated with defensive counterterror actions. In
what follows, payoffs that are capitalized represent public consequences of strategic
actions and lower-case variables measure private (individual) consequences. Specif-
ically, consider a collective action environment with a public good having benefit B
(i.e. to both countries) at individual private cost of provision c. Similarly, an action that
creates private benefit b does so by simultaneously creating a public ‘bad’ denoted by
cost C.
Arce and Sandler (2005a) note that preventative/counterterrorism actions such as
compromising a cell or destroying a training ground have classic public goods prop-
erties. For example, the action Prevention keeps a terrorist from attacking any of its
targets, regardless of nationality, thereby creating a public benefit B for all targeted
nations at a private cost to the acting nation of c. Such a 2-player situation is denoted
in the northwest 2 × 2 collection of cells in the game in Table 1, where a value of
0 denotes the status quo payoff. Under the standard assumptions for the voluntary
provision of public good, 2B > c > B > 0, no action is taken—yielding Olson (1965)
classic free rider problem.
By contrast, when a targeted nation engages in defensive counterterror activities
such as body scans at airports or hardening the defenses around embassies, public costs,
C, are created in terms of lost civil liberties and/or the targeting of another nation or
the acting nation’s citizens in a foreign country. For example, the vast majority of US
Table 1 Nested prisoner’s dilemma
Prevention Take no action Defense
Prevention 2B − c, 2B − c B − c, B B − c − C, b + B − C
Take no action B,B − c 0,0 −C, b − C
Defense b + B − C,B − c − C b − C,−C b − 2C, b − 2C
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victims of terror are attacked outside of the US and the emphasis on defensive policy
in theWesternWorld subsequent to the attacks of 9/11, 3/11 and 7/7 in the US,Madrid
and London, respectively, have caused fundamentalist terror activities to relocate to
Southeast Asia. Defensive actions create private benefit, b, and public costs,C, where
it is typically assumed that 2C > b > C>0. The resulting 2-player game is given in
the 2 × 2 collection of cells in the southeast of Table 1. Under standard assumptions
this yields Harden (1968) Tragedy of the Commons, because Defense is dominant,
but the (Defense, Defense) outcome is Pareto-dominated by mutual inaction.
This game combines a 2 × 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma in the northwest four cells of
Table 1 with another 2 × 2 Prisoner’s Dilemma in the southeast four cells. For this
reason the resulting 3 × 3 global security game is called a Nested PD game. Under
the assumptions given above, Defense is the dominant strategy in the global security
game, leading to an outcome that not only is Pareto-dominated by mutual Prevention
and mutual inaction (Take NoAction), but also represents the outcome with the lowest
total payoffs. This leads to the novel observation that inefficiency increases when the
public goods and commons versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma are combined. Under
this scenario, we infer that mutual cooperation would be highly improbable.
Nonetheless, there are policies that can be used to alleviate the potential prob-
lems associated with choosing the socially-optimal Prevention strategy. For instance,
“burden-sharing” institutions can be created amongmember states to share the costs of
Prevention activities. For example, Sandler et al. (2011) have shown that INTERPOL’s
MIND/FIND database for stolen and lost travel documents is a particularly effective
form of defensive counterterror policy, and member nations voluntarily contribute to
INTERPOL’s budget.
NATO and UN are examples of organizations that both coordinate activities that are
akin to preventative counterterror measures (e.g. peacekeeping missions) and rely on
voluntary contributions.Whether such institution-building is aworthwhile activity and
what form such an institution should take can be best answered within an experimental
framework.
In particular, within the structure of the Nested PD game, whenever a country
chooses the Prevention action, part of the private cost c will be transferred to the other
nation, as is consistent with pre-determined burden-sharing arrangements in many
international organizations such as the UN, NATO, etc. Let f be the fraction of cost
that is shared in the burden sharing agreement. In order to keep the current structure
of the game, the following constraint on the burden share fraction f must be met:
f < 2/3
Above that critical value the fundamental structure of the game is altered and Defense
is no longer a strictly dominant strategy. Note that, while Defense remains a dominant
strategy for burden-sharing less than 2/3, lower values can alter the equilibrium of
the Prevention subgame (in the upper left four cells of the matrix). In particular for f
above 1/3, mutual Prevention would be an equilibrium of the stand-alone Prevention
game. This is discussed in more detail in the experimental design below.
Table 2 demonstrates the changes that occur to Table 1 when a burden sharing
mechanism is implemented for the cost of the Prevention strategy. As an example, if
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Table 2 Changes in payoff due
to burden sharing
Prevention Take no action Defense
Prevention 0,0 +f(c),−f(c) +f(c),−f(c)
Take no action −f(c),+f(c) 0,0 0,0
Defense −f(c),+f(c) 0,0 0,0
Table 3 Baseline nested
prisoner’s dilemma
Prevention Take no action Defense
Prevention 9,9 5,11 1,13
Take no action 11,5 7,7 3,9
Defense 13,1 9,3 5,5
the row player selects Take No Action while the column player chooses Prevention,
the payoff to the row player isB− f c and the payoff to the column player isB−c+ f c.
Within the range for f given above burden sharing has no theoretical implications for
the global security game, but as will be seen below burden-sharing has significant
normative implications for coordinating counterterror policy.
3 Experimental design
This experiment involves a baseline and three treatments testing different levels of
cost sharing for Prevention. The baseline is a direct test of the theory presented in
Arce and Sandler (2005a) and has been tested previously in Arce et al. (2011a,b).
It is important to distinguish the current contribution from that paper. Both use the
same baseline protocol, but Arce et al. compare the baseline game in Table 3 with a
probabilistic version with the same expected payoffs. The current paper utilizes the
same baseline, but compares the baseline to three different levels of burden-sharing.
It does not include a probabilistic version of the game.
The Baseline (in both papers) consists of 20 rounds with payoffs shown in Table 3.
This game is played for 20 rounds with stable partners (randomly assigned), with a
21st round where subjects are randomly rematched and payoffs increased by a factor
of 10. The 21st round is included to provide a direct test of the theory. By the 21st
round subjects are familiar with the game, and have some experience with one partner.
The 21st round increases incentives sharply, and, in theory, random rematching should
make the game play independent of prior rounds.
To prevent a potential focal point bias around the payoff of zero, we set 7 tokens
as the status quo amount per round. Therefore, the Baseline payoffs are as follows,
where B = 4, b = 6, C = 4, c = 6, and f = 0 (indicates no burden sharing):
The goal of this experiment is to determine if enforced sharing of the cost of
choosing Prevention will lead to more cooperative play between two players, even if
Defense is still the overall dominant strategy. Therefore, we designed 3 treatmentswith
different levels of burden sharing where we adjust the proportion of Prevention costs
that are shared. We call these treatments High, Moderate, and Low Burden Sharing.
In the Low Burden Sharing treatment, 1/6 of the cost of Prevention is transferred to
the other player. Therefore, in Table 2, f = 16 , and since the private cost of selecting
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Table 4 Nested PD games with
burden sharing
Prevention Take no action Defense
A, Low burden sharing
Prevention 9,9 6,10 2,12
Take no action 10,6 7,7 3,9
Defense 12,2 9,3 5,5
B, Moderate burden sharing
Prevention 9,9 7,9 3,11
Take no action 9,7 7,7 3,9
Defense 11,3 9,3 5,5
C, High burden sharing
Prevention 9,9 8,8 4,10
Take no action 8,8 7,7 3,9
Defense 10,4 9,3 5,5
Prevention is 6 units in our experiment, the total amount of the cost of Prevention that
is transferred to the other player is equal to 1. Therefore, since the cost of selecting
a strategy of Prevention is six, one unit of the cost of Prevention is transferred to the
other player. Table 4A below shows the normal form payoff matrix used in the Low
Burden Sharing treatment.
In the Moderate Burden Sharing treatment, f = 13 , and in the High Burden Sharing
treatment, f = 12 , and since the private cost of selecting Prevention is constant at 6
units, the two units of cost are transferred to the other player in the Moderate Burden
Sharing treatment, and three units in the High Burden Sharing treatment. Tables 4B,
C show the normal form payoff matrices used in the Moderate and the High Burden
Sharing treatments.
The burden sharing proportions where selected based on two criteria. First, we
selected proportions that corresponded to integer shares of costs of Prevention to
keep the decision environment as simple as possible for subjects. Second and more
importantly, because the burden-sharing fraction is always below 2/3, the Defense is
the strictly dominant strategy for both players.
While the burden sharing treatments do not alter the Nash equilibrium of the Nested
PD, they do have an effect on the equilibrium of the stand-alone Prevention game (top
left four cells). In theBaseline andLowBurden Sharing games,mutual TakeNoAction
is the single Nash equilibrium of the stand-alone game. However, with Moderate
BurdenSharing, thePreventiongamehas twoweakequilbria: both commonPrevention
and common Take No Action are equilibria, with Prevention Pareto-dominant. With
High Burden Sharing, mutual Prevention becomes the only Nash equilibrium of the
Prevention game. Note that in all cases Defense remains the dominant strategy for the
full Nested PD game.
Note that following the classic “unraveling” argument given in Luce and Raiffa
(1957), the sub-game perfect equilibrium for any of the three versions of the game
tested is the same as for the baseline stage game: the playerswill always selectDefense,
which strictly dominates Prevention and Take No Action. This is because we keep the
burden-sharing fraction, f , less than the critical value of 2/3, above which Defense
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is no longer a strictly dominant strategy. In addition, while Take No Action strongly
dominates Prevention for the baseline and the Low Burden Sharing treatment, it only
weakly dominates Prevention in the Moderate Burden Sharing and is dominated by
Prevention in the High Burden Sharing treatment. However, as long as all players are
payoff-maximizers, they have no reason to deviate from Defense in any treatment.5
4 Hypotheses
The idea that cooperation in repeated PD is sensitive to changes in incentives to the
size of the incentives to deviate from mutual defection and mutual cooperation goes
back to Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and Rapoport (1967). The intuition is simple:
cooperation will be decreasing in the size of the incentives to unilaterally deviate from
mutual cooperation (and the penalty paid when deviating from mutual defection). In
our paper,we systematicallymanipulate the cardinality of these relationships by reduc-
ing the incentives to deviate frommutual cooperation, and at the same time decreasing
the penalty for deviating from mutual defection. Moreover, our manipulation has two
interesting features: it is symmetric and linear.
We can illustrate this ideawith a simple intuition coming fromTables 3 and 4. In our
baseline, the incentive to deviate from mutual Prevention is 4. Payoffs increase from
9 to a maximum of 13 when a player deviates from mutual Prevention to Defense.
Symmetrically, the penalty for a unilateral deviation from mutual Defense is also
4. Payoffs decrease from 5 to a minimum of 1 when a player unilaterally deviates
from Nash and chooses Prevention. By introducing cost sharing, we manipulate these
incentives (and penalties). In the Low Burden Sharing condition, the incentives to
deviate are 3, in the Moderate condition 2, and in the High sharing treatment is only
1. Note that penalties for deviations from Nash also decrease from 4 in the baseline to
1 in the High Burden Sharing condition.
In an interesting experiment, Ahn et al. (2001) check the effect of cardinal manipu-
lations and learning spillovers in a sequence of one-shot PD games. Even though our
experiment is very different from theirs, we follow closely their behavioral conjectures
to formulate a simple behavioral conjecture for this game:6
Conjecture 1: The rate of cooperationwill be decreasing in the incentives (penalties)
to deviate from mutual Prevention (Defense).
This simple conjecture allows us to order our four experimental treatments by the
expected frequencies of Prevention (Defense):
5 There are additional theoretical considerations for the repeated version of this game, illuminated byKreps
and Wilson (1982) and Axelrod (1984). However, we limit our theoretical analysis to the stage game. Of
course there are behavioral considerations for the repeated version of the game as well, following Shafir
and Tversky (1992). Fairness concerns may potentially come into play as in Charness and Rabin (2002), as
burden sharing reduces differences in payoffs associated with unilateral Prevention.
6 Ahn et al. (2001) are mainly interested in whether playing different coordination games in the Phase 1 of
the experiment had any effect in two sequences of one-shot coordination games and PDs. They manipulate
the size of the incentives to deviate in the one shot PDs in a binary way, much coarser than ours (high or low),
and also alter the symmetry of incentives and penalties (High–High, High–Low, Low–High, Low–Low).
Their behavioral conjectures are presented in pages 140 and 141.
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PrevHigh−BS > PrevMod−BS PrevLow−BS > PrevBSL
(Def High−BS < Def Mod−BS < Def Low−BS < Def BSL)
Note that an alternative hypothesis based on the assumption of fully rational and
selfish players applying backward induction (and this being common knowledge)
would predict no differences across treatments.
5 Procedure
All sessions were conducted at the Center for Behavioral and Economic Experi-
mental Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. A total of 142 undergraduates
from various academic disciplines (including economics) and with no previous his-
tory of playing the Nested PD game were recruited via the ORSEE system (Greiner
2004). There were 12 sessions, three sessions per treatment, and twelve subjects par-
ticipated in each session (except for one baseline treatment session, where only ten
subjects participated). No subject participated in more than one session. Once sub-
jects were present in the lab common area, each was randomly assigned to a com-
puter terminal where partitions ensured that subjects could not see each other’s deci-
sions. Before beginning the experimental instructions, the subjects were told not to
communicate with each other, but to feel free to ask questions. Then subjects read
the self-paced, computerized experimental instructions, which explained the base-
line game and externalities associated with different strategies, and the level of bur-
den sharing tied with the Prevention game. They were shown the complete matrix
itself and were informed that earnings would be cumulative. The experiment was pro-
grammed using z-tree software (Fischbacher 2007); instructions are available in online
Appendix B.
Given the complexity of the asymmetric externalities in the Nested PD, we opted
for instructions that are framed and have naturalistic, somewhat loaded language.
Therefore, the Nested PD game was presented to subjects as an interaction between
countries willing to reduce the possibility of a terrorist attack.We believe that by using
a naturalistic context wewere able to explain in a simpler andmore convincingway the
nature of the game, as well as the different consequences of Prevention and Defense.
Given that instructions were identically framed in each treatment, they cannot explain
any treatment effect.7 Moreover, we control for the emergence of “hot” behavioral
reactions of some subjects by running an in-depth questionnaire at the end of the
7 The instructions were prepared using a frame that was designed to make the game easier for subjects to
understand. The loaded language alsomay have affected perceptions about the appropriateness of alternative
strategies: since the theory we are testing is explicitly motivated by the need to coordinate anti-terrorism
policy, greater external validity is likely when the game is also framed in this way. Previous research on the
prisoner’s dilemma game finds increased levels of cooperation when the game is framed as a cooperative
situation: for example, Liberman et al. (2004) found that naming the PD game a “Community” versus “Wall
Street” game generated differences in levels of cooperation. However, in contrast, Abbink and Hennig-
Schmidt (2006) find no effect of loaded terms such as “bribery” versus abstract wording in a bribery
experiment. There is also some debate about the external validity of neutral framing, that norm activation
and other psychology factors should be accounted for (see Eckel and Grossman 1996; Loomes 1999).
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experiment. As it will be clear in the next section, individual preferences played no
role in explaining the different treatment effects.8
Once the subjects finished reading the instructions, they were given six examples
and a quiz to ensure that they understood the game. Participants also were notified
that for the first 20 rounds of the experiment they would be playing with a single
partner, and that on the 21st round, they would be randomly re-matched with another
partner. Once the experiment started, players were shown the results and earnings of
their decisions each round. Subjects were not shown a history of previous play, but
were given a record sheet to record game play and earnings in each round. After the
first 20 rounds, subjects then read a short description of the 21st round, where they
were reminded that they would be randomly re-matched, and informed that payoffs
for that round were increased to 10 times the amounts in the previous rounds. Once the
experiment was finished, the subjects then completed a short survey, at the conclusion
of which they were paid in private the $5 show up fee and experimental earnings.
On average the experiment took approximately 50min, and the survey and pay-
outs an additional 35min. Average experiment earnings for the baseline were $20.93
($14.75 without the 21st round), for the Low Burden Sharing treatment was $20.44
($14.78 without the 21st round), for theModerate Burden Sharing was $22.46 ($15.90
without the 21st round), and for the High Burden Sharing was $25.64 ($17.94 without
the 21st round).9
6 Results
The results section is organized as follows. First we present the aggregate data, sep-
arating out rounds 1 and 21, because these are the only rounds where behavior is
arguably independent of prior decisions. We then turn to a more in-depth discussion
of individual behavior in rounds 1 and 21. This is followed by a panel data analysis of
the repeated-game portion of the experiment: rounds 1–21. Finally, we discuss strat-
egy coordination, asking how frequently pairs of subjects successfully coordinate on
a common strategy choice.
6.1 Aggregate decisions
Table 5 contains information about the sample and the average subject play in the
baseline and the three burden sharing treatments, for rounds 1–20 and round 21 sep-
arately.10 From the table, we see that, as more of the cost of choosing Prevention is
8 We present some additional analysis in a longer online version with an additional Appendix B (Kass et al.
2014). Table 1’ in thisAppendixBpresents the information collected in the questionnaire, including political
orientation, views on the US role in the world, or government spending.We also collected information about
subjects’ demographics in thirteen different dimensions.
9 Table 1’ in Kass et al. (2014), see Appendix B (Electronic SupplementaryMaterial), contains comparison
tests of the subject characteristics and beliefs between the treatments. Only the proportions of married
subjects and full time students are different between the treatments below a 0.1 significance threshold, and
neither drives results in our regression models.
10 Baseline data are from Arce et al. (2011a,b).
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics, rounds 1, 1–20, and 21
Baseline Low burden
sharing
Moderate burden
sharing
High burden
sharing
Subjects 34 36 36 36
Pairs 17 18 18 18
Observations 714 756 756 756
Round 1
Prevention 55.88% 63.89% 69.44% 88.89%
Take no action 29.41% 11.11% 8.33% 2.78%
Defense 14.71% 25.00% 22.22% 8.33%
Average profit 7.82 (3.31) 7.78 (3.35) 7.94 (2.64) 8.61 (1.46)
Rounds 1–20
Prevention 55.59% 54.17% 72.08% 89.31%
Take no action 7.65% 11.11% 3.33% 1.25%
Defense 36.76% 34.72% 24.58% 9.44%
Average total profit 147.53 (31.98) 147.78 (30.68) 159.00 (26.31) 171.94 (16.53)
Average round profit 7.38 (2.78) 7.39 (2.52) 7.95 (2.14) 8.60 (1.33)
Round 21
Prevention 26.47% 11.11% 38.89% 69.44%
Take no action 5.88% 11.11% 0% 0%
Defense 67.65% 77.78% 61.11% 30.56%
Average profit 61.76 (46.48) 56.67 (29.08) 65.56 (32.82) 81.11 (22.65)
Average total profit 209.29 (52.17) 204.44 (39.23) 224.56 (47.76) 256.39 (23.66)
Standard deviations are in parenthesis
shared with the counterpart, players choose Prevention more frequently. Except for
round 21 where Defense selections are more common and constitute the most com-
mon strategy for all but the High Burden Sharing treatment. In the baseline, 55.59%
of subjects choose Prevention. This fraction is slightly lower for the LowBurden Shar-
ing treatment, but increases steadily thereafter, reaching 89.31% with High Burden
Sharing. The last line of the table is average total profit for each subject (up to round
20), and it is increasing with the level of burden sharing as well. In the aggregate, there
is evidence of social gains associated with burden sharing agreements, even though
burden sharing itself does not alter the aggregate benefit-cost structure (payoffs are
always identical across treatments, for each common pair of decisions). For round 21,
in the baseline, 26.5% of subjects choose Prevention. This fraction is considerably
lower for the Low Burden Sharing treatment (11.1%), but increases steadily there-
after, reaching 69.4% with High Burden Sharing. Round 21 profits echo the results in
rounds 1–20. In combining rounds 1–20 and round 21, only the Moderate and High
Burden Sharing treatments generate social gains.
Figure 1 illustrates the fraction of Prevention decisions by round, and suggests
that play in round 1 is a relatively good predictor of decisions in rounds 1–19, as
average Prevention selections per round never deviate much, in any treatment. From
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Fig. 1 Percent of subjects choosing Prevention in each round
Fig. 1,we see that different burden sharing institutions generate very similar Prevention
dynamics, and the proportion of Prevention decisions remain relatively constant, with
a strong endgame effect in round 20 and a further decline in the re-matched round 21.
The exception is the High Burden Sharing treatment, in which Prevention selections
increase slightly.11
There is no apparent reaction to Low Burden Sharing, and only a modest change
when burden sharing reaches a Moderate level. This modest effect occurs as subjects
abandon both the Take No Action and the Defense options. However, the dramatic
shift observed in the High Burden Sharing treatment is not explained by a drop in the
Take No Action selections (a difference of 2.08% points), but rather by a reduction in
Defense. We analyze these different patterns more formally below.
6.2 Round 1 and round 21
We next turn our attention to an investigation of rounds 1 and 21 play for two reasons.
First, we consider this to be a natural way to analyze the data, as in round 1 there
has been no interaction and data are free of any influence of prior play, and in round
21 subjects are experienced, but are matched with new partners for higher stakes,
arguably making them independent from prior rounds.
11 Figure 3 in Kass et al. (2014), see Appendix B (Electronic Supplementary Material), shows the distribu-
tion of Prevention decisions and earnings by subject. The histograms suggest that subjects are not reacting
to changes in the burden sharing parameter in a linear, or even strictly monotonic manner.
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Table 6 Nonparametric tests,
round 1
Prevention Take no action Defense
A. Actions selected in round 1
No burden sharing 19 10 5
Low burden sharing 23 4 9
Moderate burden
sharing
25 3 8
High burden sharing 32 1 3
No burden
sharing
Low burden
sharing
Moderate
burden
sharing
B. Fisher exact test (prevention, take no action,
defense), p values shown
Low burden sharing 0.133 – –
Moderate burden
sharing
0.073 0.867 –
High burden sharing 0.004 0.043 0.127
C. Fisher exact test (prevention vs. non-prevention),
p values shown
Low burden sharing 0.626 – –
Moderate burden
sharing
0.323 0.803 –
High burden sharing 0.003 0.025 0.079
Table 6A presents the aggregate actions taken by subjects in round 1 and Table 6B,
C contain p values from the Fisher Exact test. In Table 6B, we see evidence that the
Moderate Burden Sharing and the High Burden Sharing treatments are significantly
different from the Baseline. Table 6C presents a slightly different approach, and tests
for differences in Prevention as opposed to the aggregate choice of other strategies
(Take No Action and Defense decisions are aggregated into one “Non-Prevention”
variable.) This more clearly illustrates that in round 1, subject decision-making only
leads to more socially beneficial outcomes when subjects are interacting in the High
Burden Sharing environment. We conclude that even in first round play, High Bur-
den Sharing has a substantial impact on the play of Prevention as a counterterrorism
strategy.
Table 7 presents the results of a binary Logit model using round 1 data where
the dependent variable is Prevention and we control for treatment, demographics and
personal preferences.12 Table 7 strongly suggests that only the High Burden Sharing
12 Demographics include binary variables gender (0 = male, 1 = female, white (Yes = 1), Married
(Yes = 1), children (Yes = 1), live with parents (Yes = 1), grad student (Yes = 1), economics student
(Yes = 1), full time student (Yes = 1), Christian (Yes = 1), US Citizen (Yes = 1), republican (Yes = 1).
Ordinal demographic variables are father’s education level and religiosity. Interval demographic variables
are age, family income, and number of bathrooms in the subject’s household. Preferences include binary vari-
ables such as if the person views him/herself as politically conservative, if the subject believes the US should
have a strong leadership role, believes that she/he is politically astute, believes that minorities face discrim-
ination, believes that the amount of immigrants in the US should decrease, believes that the US should be
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Table 7 Strategy choice, round 1
Dependent variable: prevention Model 1 Model 2c
Dependent variable is prevention. Logit regression models, marginal effects shown
Low burden sharing 0.066 0.151
(0.095) (0.096)
Moderate burden sharing 0.115 0.017*
(0.096) (0.097)
High burden sharing 0.362*** 0.403***
(0.113) (0.110)
Demographicsa N Y
Preferencesb N Y
Log Likelihood −81.59 −73.61
McFadden’s R2 0.063 0.155
McFadden’s R2 adjusted 0.017 −0.098
AIC 171.19 191.23
BIC 183.01 256.26
Observations 142 142
Low burden shar-
ing = moderate
burden sharing
Moderate burden
sharing = high
burden sharing
Low burden shar-
ing = high burden
sharing
Wald test p values for differences between treatment coefficients
Model 1 0.6174 0.0500 0.0173
Model 2 0.8136 0.0652 0.0390
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
a Demographics include binary variables gender (0 = male, 1 = female), white (Yes = 1), Married
(Yes = 1), children (Yes = 1), live with parents (Yes = 1), grad student (Yes = 1), economics student
(Yes= 1), full time student (Yes= 1), Christian (Yes= 1), US Citizen (Yes= 1), and republican (Yes= 1).
Ordinal demographic variables are father’s education level and religiosity. Interval demographic variables
are age, family income, and number of bathrooms in the subject’s household
b Preferences include binary variables such as if the person views him/herself as politically conservative,
if the subject believes the US should have a strong leadership role, believes that she/he is politically
astute, believes that minorities face discrimination, believes that the amount of immigrants in the US
should decrease, believes that the US should be a more isolationist country, and if the subject believes
that government spending should increase. Preference variables are based on 10 point Likert scales and
include: if the subject views her/himself as a risk taker rather than avoiding risks, as impatient and satisfying
immediate rather than long term concerns, and if the subject focuses on taking care of him/herself rather
than others
c In Model 2, the only demographic and preference independent variables that are statistically significant
are “white” at the 0.1 level and “impatience” at the 0.05 level
Footnote 12 continued
a more isolationist country, and if the subject believes that government spending should increase. Prefer-
ences variables that include 10-point Likert scales are measures of risk-tolerance, patience and altruism.
See Table 2’ in Kass et al. (2014), Appendix B (Electronic Supplementary Material), for coefficients on
these demographic and personal preference effects.
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Table 8 Round 21 (rematched, 10× stakes)
Prevention Take no action Defense
A. Actions selected in Round 21
No burden sharing 9 2 23
Low burden sharing 4 4 28
Moderate burden sharing 14 0 22
High burden sharing 25 0 11
No burden sharing Low burden sharing Moderate burden sharing
B. Fisher exact test (prevention, take no action, defense), p values shown
Low burden sharing 0.254 – –
Moderate burden sharing 0.248 0.005 –
High burden sharing 0.001 <0.001 0.017
C. Fisher exact test (prevention vs. non-prevention), p values shown
Low burden sharing 0.129 – –
Moderate burden sharing 0.315 0.013 –
High burden sharing <0.001 <0.001 0.017
treatment has a significant effect on the choice of Prevention, as the high burden-
sharing coefficient is always positive and significant in the models.13 The marginal
effect suggests that subjects are 36–40% points more likely to select Prevention in
round 1 of the High Burden Sharing treatment than in the baseline, while the other two
burden-sharing institutions (Low andModerate) play at most a weak role in enhancing
Prevention.
We now turn to a discussion of the round 21 data. The best way to examine the
robustness of the results found in round 1 is to look at the decisions made in the final
round, where subjects are re-matched, and stakes are multiplied by ten. Before round
21, they are reminded that they are to be re-matched, and are told that the stakes will
be ten times the previous round. This allows us to test the theory on its own domain.
The model is one-shot, and round 21 is a one-shot game with experienced subjects.
Since they are knowledgeable about the game, their response to the new partner and
high stakes gives the theory its best shot.
Tables 8A–C, and 9 presents information parallel to the tables for round 1 data.
Table 8A presents the aggregate actions taken by subjects in round 21 and Tables 8B,
C contains the nonparametric results from the Fisher Exact test. The results more
strongly support the notion that the High Burden Sharing treatment produces differ-
ences in behavior. Akin to Table 6C, Table 8C combines the Take No Action and
Defense decisions in a general “Non-Prevention” variable, demonstrating that the
High Burden Sharing treatment encourages more Prevention choices as compared
13 Multinomial logit regressions, modeling Prevention and Defense choices, showing similar results can
be found in the companion paper Kass et al. (2014), Table 3’ in Appendix B (Electronic Supplementary
Material).
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Table 9 Strategy choice, round 21 (rematched, 10× stakes)
Dependent variable:
prevention
Model 1 Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b
Dependent variable is prevention. Logit regression models, marginal effects shown
Low burden sharing −0.193* −0.163 −0.168 −0.163
(0.110) (0.108) (0.114) (0.114)
Moderate burden sharing 0.106 0.109 0.057 0.062
(0.095) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092)
High burden sharing 0.400*** 0.455*** 0.309*** 0.300***
(0.110) (0.093) (0.089) (0.088)
Prev. history (Rounds 1–20)a 0.0162***
(0.005)
Coop history (Rounds 1–20)a 0.014***
(0.004)
Demographics N Y Y Y
Preferences N Y Y Y
Log Likelihood −78.42 −64.32 −56.60 −59.06
McFadden’s R2 0.159 0.310 0.393 0.367
McFadden’s R2 adjusted 0.116 0.075 0.147 0.120
AIC 164.84 172.64 159.20 164.13
BIC 176.67 237.67 227.19 232.11
Observations 142 142 142 142
Low burden shar-
ing = moderate
burden sharing
Moderate burden shar-
ing = high burden
sharing
Low burden sharing =
high burden sharing
Wald test p values for differences between treatment coefficients
Model 1 0.0099 0.106 <0.001
Model 2 0.0203 0.003 <0.001
Model 3 0.0321 0.0005 0.0796
Model 4 0.0256 0.0003 0.0679
Model 5 0.0548 0.0167 <0.001
Model 6 0.0455 0.0156 <0.001
Standard errors in parentheses, panel logit, 21st round data only ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
a Regressors as are follows: “Prev. history” is the count of Prevention selections by the subject from Rounds
1–20. “Coop history” is the aggregate number of instances where both subjects selected Prevention in a
given round
b InModels 2, 5, and6, the demographic andpreference independent variables that are statistically significant
(for all three models) include: economics students at the 0.1 level and subject preferences on government
spending and attitudes toward risk, both significant at the 0.01 level
to the other treatments. For both experienced and inexperienced subjects, the High
Burden Sharing environment appears unique in facilitating socially optimal play.
To account for history and subject characteristics, Table 9 contains several Logit
regression models. Prevention is the binary dependent variable, and we control for
demographics and personal preferences. As in round 1, we see that only when burden-
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sharing reaches its maximum level does it significantly increase the probability of
Prevention, and subjects are 40–46% points more likely to select Prevention than in
the baseline game (shown in Models 1 and 2, which parallel Table 7). Indeed, Model
1 implies that Low Burden Sharing may be worse than no sharing at all; however,
the difference between this treatment and the Baseline becomes insignificant when
demographics and preferences are included (Model 2).
To account for experience, Models 3–4 incorporate two alternative ways of includ-
ing subjects’ previous history as an explanatory variable. Model 3 contains “Prev.
history”, which is defined as the sum of all Prevention choices by a subject from
rounds 1–20. Model 4 incorporates the variable “Coop history,” defined as the sum
of all instances from rounds 1–20 where paired subjects both selected Prevention in a
given round. Both models show that game history has a powerful effect on subjects’
choices, even though they are matched with a new partner. Thus while higher incen-
tives and rematching reduce the extent to which subjects select Prevention, still they
are strongly affected by their previous experience in the game. Including these mea-
sures reduces the magnitude of the coefficients on the treatment variables somewhat,
but maintains significance. Wald tests are reported at the bottom of Table 9.14
The next step in this analysis is to determine whether these treatments affect aggre-
gate earnings. While Prevention is selected more frequently, these gains could be
nullified by an increase in the play of Defense, leaving the cost-sharing treatments
unable to generate a more positive aggregate social outcome. An earnings regression
on round 21 data shows a positive, significant effect of the High Burden Sharing treat-
ment, with subjects earning $17-$22 more in that treatment as compared with the
baseline.15
6.3 Game dynamics
In this section we report panel data analysis in order to better understand the dynamics
of play in the repeated Nested PD game. Table 10 shows themarginal effects estimated
from a random effects logit model.16 These models examine the binary decision of
whether the subject selected Prevention or not. Model 1 includes only the treatment
variables and period dummy variables to capture any time-dependent variation. In this
analysis, there is evidence that the Moderate and the High Burden Sharing treatments
increase the probability of choosing Prevention. As the Wald tests show, differences
between treatments are consistently significant. In theModerate Burden Sharing treat-
ment subjects are about 20% points more likely to choose Prevention, and in the High
Burden Sharing treatment, 47% points more likely (relative to the baseline). No sig-
14 Note that removing demographics and preferences from these regressions leaves the results qualitatively
unchanged, except that the coefficient on “Low Burden Sharing” become marginally significant, as in
Model 1. Table 4’ in the Appendix (Electronic Supplementary Material) contains the coefficients on the
demographic and personal preference effects from Table 9.
15 See Table 5’ in Kass et al. (2014), appendix B (Electronic Supplementary Material) for more details.
16 Marginal effects are calculated in Stata using the “margins” command. Tables 6’ and 7’ in the companion
paper Kass et al. (2014), Appendix B (Electronic Supplementary Material), control for demographics and
show that results are robust to different specifications of the models.
123
The UN in the lab 643
Table 10 Strategy choice, rounds 1–20
Dependent variable: prevention Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent variable is prevention. Random effects logit regression models, marginal effects shown
Low burden sharing −0.008 0.0616 0.085 0.058*
(0.1052) (0.0775) (0.0700) (0.0323)
Moderate burden sharing 0.202* 0.150* 0.202*** 0.081**
(0.1112) (0.0772) (0.0638) (0.0350)
High burden sharing 0.472*** 0.250*** 0.292*** 0.106**
(0.1429) (0.0922) (0.0786) (0.0449)
Prevention lag (lagPrev) 0.341*** 0.223***
(0.0386) (0.0229)
LowBS*lagPrev −0.127** −0.059*
(0.0531) (0.0307)
ModBS*lagPrev −0.031 −0.027
(0.0531) (0.0310)
HighBS*lagPrev 0.040 −0.011
(0.0735) (0.0399)
Counterpart prevention lag (lagCP) 0.409*** 0.247***
(0.0406) (0.0254)
LowBS*lagCP −0.159*** −0.059*
(0.0562) (0.0327)
ModBS*lagCP −0.150*** −0.066**
(0.0528) (0.0334)
HighBS*lagCP −0.089 −0.069*
(0.0704) (0.0418)
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood −863.067 −670.104 −635.218 −555.558
AIC 1,774.133 1,394.209 1,360.436 1,173.116
BIC 1,916.971 1,553.516 1,519.744 1,356.024
McFadden R2 0.0769 0.2833 0.3206 0.4058
Adj McFadden R2 0.0523 0.2555 0.2928 0.3738
Observations 2,840 2,698 2,698 2,698
Number of groups 71 71 71 71
nificant differences are found between the Low Burden Sharing treatment and the
baseline.17
17 When investigating the dynamics of this finitely repeated Nested PD game, persistence may also be a
driver of behavior. As a test for persistence in our data generating processes, Figure 1 in Appendix B (Elec-
tronic Supplementary Material) of Kass et al. (2014) contains autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation
functions (ACF and PACF) of subjects’ Prevention choices indicating that the first lag (time t−1) is a driver
of the current Prevention choice at time t. In each treatment ACFs show an autoregressive process and in 3
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Table 10 continued
Low = moderate Moderate = high Low = high
Wald test p values for differences between treatment coefficients
Model 1 0.043 0.010 <0.001
Model 2 0.184 0.022 <0.001
Model 3 0.090 0.290 0.014
Model 4 0.441 0.531 0.224
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
a Regressors as are follows: “Prevention lag” is a variable whether the subject chose Prevention in the
previous round. “LowBS*lagPrev” is an interaction term of the Low Burden Sharing treatment variable
with the Prevention lag variable. “ModBS*lagPrev” is an interaction term of the Moderate Burden Sharing
treatment variable with the Prevention lag variable. “HighBS*lagPrev” is an interaction term of the High
Burden Sharing treatment variable with the Prevention lag variable. “Counterpart Prevention Lag” is a
variable whether the subject’s counterpart chose Prevention in the previous round. “LowBS*lagCP” is
an interaction term of the Low Burden Sharing treatment variable with the Counterpart Prevention Lag
variable. “ModBS*lagCP” is an interaction term of the Moderate Burden Sharing treatment variable with
theCounterpart PreventionLag variable. “HighBS*lagCP” is an interaction termof theHighBurdenSharing
treatment variable with the Counterpart Prevention Lag variable. “Round Dummies” are dummy variables
capturing time specific effect. In our setting, the round dummy variables are capturing the drop in Take No
Action selections as the subject move through the game
b In Model 5, the demographic and preference independent variable to come up as statistically significant
is the “racism” variable, a variable measuring subject beliefs about if minorities experience racism. It is
statistically significant at the 0.1 level
Models 2–4 incorporate both the subjects’ and their counterparts’ previous decisions
and treatment interaction effects. Model 2 includes own choices and treatment interac-
tions,Model 3 incorporates counterpart choices and interactions, andModel 4 both.We
include the choices in the previous round to capture reference point/persistence effects
and to account for adjustments to the counterpart’s actions. Not surprisingly, there is
evidence that subjects prefer to select Prevention when they and/or their counterparts
selected Prevention in the previous period; failure to select Prevention in a round
reduces the likelihood it will be subsequently selected. Additionally, lags subsume
much of the treatment effects, dropping the direct effect of the High Burden Sharing
treatment to 10–29% points. However, even accounting for the lags, theModerate and
High treatment effects are robust. Among the lags, we find the individual and coun-
terpart decision lags enter consistently in the different models, but the lags interacted
with the treatments do not always show consistent patterns.18
In sum, Table 10 suggests a stronger effect for Moderate Burden Sharing than in
the round 1 or 21 data alone. There is still evidence of a nonlinear impact of burden
sharing, but not as dramatically as in previous analysis. From the Wald test results,
Footnote 17 continued
out of the 4 treatment PACFs only show a significant PACF at lag 1, indicating that the process has a lag at
the previous period, but there is no evidence of a correlation with longer lags.
18 The only interaction effect that is consistently significant is the counterpart lag interacted with the High
Burden Sharing treatment. A potential explanation is that in the High Burden Sharing environment, some
subjects may defect to capture additional earnings at time t when the counterpart shows willingness to play
optimally at time t − 1.
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there is less evidence of a clear-cut difference between treatment marginal effects from
models that account for choice lags and interaction covariates.
The impact on earnings echoes this analysis. In an ordinary least squares model on
total earnings as of round 20, we also find that the Moderate Burden Sharing, along
with High Burden Sharing, produce increases in aggregate round 20 earnings in this
repeated play environment.19 These results show a consistent positive effect of the
Moderate and High Burden Sharing treatments on earnings. Using Model 1, subjects
earn about $11 more per decision in the Moderate Burden Sharing treatment and $24
more in the High Burden Sharing treatment than in the other treatments. In general,
the direction and significance of results is robust to inclusion of demographics and
preferences.
6.4 Cooperation as mutual prevention
While the individual decision data provide a measure of individual choices, it seems
natural to analyze how different pairs of participants coordinate across the different
symmetric solutions. We use the term coordination, even when mutual Prevention is
never an equilibrium of the one-shot stage game. Exploring cooperation asmutual Pre-
vention has an advantage, as the data are now cross-sectionally independent. Figure 2
presents the general picture. Aggregate mutual Prevention in rounds 1–20 increases
with burden sharing. However, aswe observedwith individual observations on Preven-
tion, coordination on a mutual strategy in round 21 is more difficult. Pairs are likely to
coordinate on mutual Prevention only when the burden sharing is High, where almost
45% of the pairs reached mutual cooperation.20 Mutual Prevention is never observed
in the baseline or the Low Burden Sharing treatment (therefore metric comparisons
between baseline and treatments are not possible) and it rarely happens withModerate
Burden Sharing.
Table 11 contains random-effects regression models, and incorporates the previous
ability of the pair to cooperate (as a test of persistence, Model 2) and the interaction
terms of previous cooperation with the treatment dummies (Model 3).21 As with the
individual Prevention decisions, treatment effects are weakened by including the lag.
Still, the High Burden Sharing marginal effect is significant and positive in each
model, but the Moderate burden sharing treatment is only significant in Models 1 and
3. The Low burden sharing treatment is never significantly different from the baseline,
supporting again the non-linear effect of burden sharing.
19 See Table 8’ in Appendix B (Electronic Supplementary Material), Kass et al. (2014).
20 Since close to 70% of subjects in round 21 chose Prevention in the High Burden Sharing treatment, the
predicted value of two subjects forming a cooperative pair is around 49%. Therefore 45% of successful
coordination on Prevention is very sensible given the predictions.
21 Figure 2 in Appendix B (Electronic SupplementaryMaterial) of Kass et al. (2014) shows autocorrelation
and partial autocorrelation functions (ACF and PACF) of coordination. Except for the Low Burden Sharing
treatment,ACFs showaclear indication of an autoregressive process and thesePACFsonly showa significant
PACF at lag 1,indicating that the process has a lag at time t − 1.
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Fig. 2 symmetric choices in rounds 1–20 and round 21
7 Conclusions
In this paper we test the effect of burden sharing on the ability of countries to success-
fully coordinate on efficient counterterrorism policies.We use a laboratory experiment
to test, on its own domain, a simple theoretical model first described in Arce and San-
dler (2005a,b). In that model the policy alternatives faced by countries are combined
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Table 11 Strategy coordination, rounds 1–20
Dependent variable: mutual prevention
(cooperation)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ismutual prevention. Randomeffects logit regressionmodels, at the pair level,marginal
effects shown
Low burden sharing 0.032 −0.003 0.060
(0.1889) (0.0459) (0.0522)
Moderate burden sharing 0.351** 0.062 0.146***
(0.1704) (0.0506) (0.0570)
High burden sharing 0.780*** 0.115* 0.134**
(0.1869) (0.0600) (0.0699)
Lagged cooperation 0.324*** 0.429***
(0.0322) (0.0635)
LowBS*lagCoop −0.135**
(0.0687)
ModBS*lagCoop −0.190***
(0.0656)
HighBS*lagCoop −0.094
(0.0736)
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood −303.598 −207.951 −202.419
AIC 655.195 463.903 458.837
BIC 781.397 588.874 599.430
McFadden R2 0.2817 0.5080 0.5211
Adj McFadden R2 0.2272 0.4535 0.4595
Observations 1,420 1,349 1,349
Number of group 71 71 71
Low = moderate Moderate = high Low = high
Wald test p values for differences between treatment coefficients
Model 1 0.142 0.061 <0.001
Model 2 0.156 0.270 0.024
Model 3 0.057 0.829 0.219
Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Regressors are as follows: “Cooperation lag” is a variablewhether paired subjectsmutually select Prevention
in the previous round. “LowBS*lagCoop” is an interaction term of the Low Burden Sharing treatment
variable with the Cooperation lag variable. “ModBS*lagCoop” is an interaction term of the Moderate
Burden Sharing treatment variable with the Cooperation lag variable. “HighBS*lagCoop” is an interaction
term of the High Burden Sharing treatment variable with the Cooperation lag variable. The positive log
likelihoods are from narrow dispersion parameters by incorporating the lagCoop variable
into a single 3×3matrix game, which embodies both the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure
of Prevention policies and the Commons structure of Defensive policies.
Interestingly, this simple game captures well the behavioral tension between choos-
ingDefense, at the collective price of increasing the cost of other players, and choosing
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Prevention, at the cost of playing a dominated strategy, and risking free-riding by oth-
ers. Prior experimental research using this game has shown that, while subjects are
more successful than theory predicts at coordinating on the non-equilibrium, welfare-
efficient strategy of Prevention, nevertheless policy coordination frequently fails (Arce
et al. 2011a,b).
In this paper we test the effectiveness of one policy for enhancing the ability of
players to coordinate on mutual Prevention: burden sharing of the cost of Prevention.
The behavioral logic is simple. By implementing this policy the cost of choosing
Prevention is shared with those players who benefit from it. As it is hard to imagine
running an empirical test of this particular variation of the model with field data, we
think the lab provides an ideal venue for wind-tunnel testing of the strategic response
of subjects to enforced burden sharing.
The experiment tests three different levels of cost sharing:Low,Moderate, andHigh,
corresponding to a shifting of up to half of the cost of Prevention to the counterpart.
The cost of choosing Prevention decreases with the level of burden sharing, as Low
Burden Sharing shifts one unit of the six-unit cost of Prevention onto the counterpart,
Moderate Burden Sharing shifts two units, and High shifts three, or half, of the cost
of Prevention.
An important feature of our design is that the burden-sharing level always falls
below the level that would alter the equilibrium structure of the game. Defense is a
dominant strategy in each experimental treatment. By reducing the strategic risk of
choosing Prevention by decreasing its cost, we measure the corresponding impact on
players’ performance. We conjectured that burden sharing would monotonically serve
to endorse the Prevention strategy, especially with the high level of contextual framing
in the instructions. However, we find that the effect is quite discontinuous. While Low
Burden Sharing has a negligible or negative impact on the choice of effective policies,
the largest amount of burden sharing has a robust, substantial and significant effect on
the ability to coordinate effective counter-terrorism policy.
A potential cause for this non-linear effect is that while the different levels of
burden sharing in our study do not affect the Nash equilibrium of the Nested PD
game, they do alter the payoffs of the game when coordination fails. A subject who
selects Prevention is partially protected from the lowest payoffs in the event that
coordination is unsuccessful. Moreover, the equilibrium prediction for the underlying
2×2 PD Prevention game actually changes when burden sharing is introduced. When
the level of burden sharing is moderate or high, not choosing Prevention is no longer a
dominant strategy. For theHighBurdenSharing treatment,mutual Prevention becomes
the unique equilibrium of this 2 × 2 game.
It should be noted that this is a different “solution” to the one proposed by Arce and
Sandler (2005a,b), which requires one of the nations to be an asymmetrically favored
target, by the terrorists. Under asymmetry, only the targeted nation prevents. What
our experiment derives is more of a “UN solution.” This is relevant because in the
post-9/11 world terrorists have shown themselves to be willing to substitute one nation
for another as a target. We identify in this paper a policy modifying the Prevention PD
game, which then spills over experimentally to the 3× 3 game, even though the Nash
equilibrium of the 3 × 3 game is never changed.
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This paper contributes to a growing literature on the behavioral analysis of con-
flict and security issues. Abbink (2012) is a nice and recent survey of the experimental
analysis of conflict. Relative to other recent papers, our research tests the effectiveness
of cost sharing in a deterministic environment. In that sense, our experiment tests the
effectiveness of a cost sharing policy when known behavioral biases, as overweight-
ing small probabilities, play no role. Keser and Montmarquette (2008) find that when
subjects have the chance of reducing the likelihood of a bad outcome for all players
they overweight small probabilities. Similarly, Cadigan and Schmitt (2010) test an
environment where players can reduce the likelihood of attack by investing in protec-
tion. They find lower than predicted spending when protection generates a negative
spillover. Relative to Colombier et al. (2011), our cost sharing policy is implemented
vertically (as a rule of the game, exogenously imposed by design) rather than horizon-
tally (as their sanctions or rewards, implemented by individual players). Maybe not
surprisingly, rewards and sanctions increase investments in the international collective
actions in a similar way to our cost sharing “UN”. In that sense, we think our approach
complements well theirs.
We believe this paper makes a significant contribution to the behavioral analysis of
conflict resolution. By testing in the laboratory the implications of different policies,
we identify an interesting and unexpected non-linearity. Burden sharing per se does
not have the capability to significantly enhance coordination on the socially efficient
strategy of Prevention, but higher levels of burden sharing do. Our results strongly
suggest that behavioral tests are useful to understand subtle changes in the institutional
environment.
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